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Abstract
Sentencing reform and “tough on crime” policies have assisted in the inflation of
the United States’ prison population by nearly 400% over the last 50 years. In 2003, justice
reinvestment was conceptualized as a way to decrease recidivism and remedy the
exorbitant correctional spending by reinvesting funds on rehabilitation and reentry
assistance to those leaving custodial institutions. Early implementations of justice
reinvestment in Connecticut and Texas achieved both savings and reductions in prison
populations. This led to the creation of the Justice Reinvestment Initiative by the U.S.
Bureau of Justice Assistance in 2010. Officials of the Justice Reinvestment Initiative
sought states who were willing to achieve bi-partisan agreements on reform and
reinvestment strategies to assist in the creation and implementation of this new policy. The
State of Oregon began this process in early 2012 and completed the process with the
enrollment of HB 3194 in July of 2013. Despite the implementation of this policy in 17
states, few evaluations have been performed on the effectiveness of justice reinvestment
policy.
This study employs a quasi-experimental time series analysis of corrections data
from the State of Oregon, the high usage county, medium usage county, and the low usage
county proxies to assess the effectiveness of the law. Counties were selected as proxies for
levels of justice reinvestment grant usage. These data include prison admissions (June 2010
– July 2016), probation admissions (June 2010 – July 2016), and the number of individuals
on community supervision (July 2010 – December 2015). Analyses reveal significant
changes in all measures. The results of this study have several implications for current and
future implementations of justice reinvestment.
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Introduction
Over the last 50 years the United States has witnessed an increase in institutional
and community corrections and related budgets. Numerous governmental agencies and
independent studies have reported that state and federal prison populations have increased
by 500-700% since the 1970’s (BJA, 2014; Pettit & Western, 2004; Sampson & Loeffler,
2010; Roberts, 2004). According to current estimates by the U.S. Department of Justice,
approximately 650,000 individuals are released from federal and state prisons each year.
Of these, approximately 429,000 individuals eventually reenter prison (DOJ, 2017).
Simultaneously, the accumulated costs of states’ expenditures on corrections also inflated
the national cost to over $51 billion in 2012 (BJA, 2014). This revolving door of offenders
has created a severe problem for the U.S. justice system. Mass incarceration is a byproduct
of both federal and state policy changes between 1970 and 2000. These include the increase
in determinant sentencing, truth-in-sentencing laws, the abolition of parole boards, the War
on Drugs, “three strikes” laws, and “One Strike You’re Out” housing policies. In response
to the problematic and high costs of tough on crime policies, some state governments are
seeking to reduce their prison populations and institutional budgets through the use of
justice reinvestment which emerged in 2003.
Justice Reinvestment refers to policies that attempt to redirect offenders from prison
to accumulate savings. Savings should then be invested in rehabilitation and reentry
programs for offenders to reduce recidivism and overall corrections budgets. Due to early
successes in Connecticut (2004), Texas (2007), and Kansas (2007) (BJA, 2014), this style
of policy reform has now been expanded to 17 states. The expansion of justice reinvestment
and the use of evidence-based practices (EBPs) is the outcome of the United States
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Congress creating the Justice Reinvestment Initiative (JRI) under the oversight of the
Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA, 2014) in 2010. One of the main features of JRI policy
is the allocation of a portion of the reinvested funds into program evaluation; which has
led to a growing number of studies examining specific programs to ensure a state’s
Departments of Corrections is utilizing EBPs (BJA, 2014). A large portion of research
resources are devoted to program evaluations. Three percent of justice reinvestment funds
are reserved for research on evaluation projects, and many of the studies receiving these
funds are ongoing.
This study addresses this gap in research by analyzing Oregon’s justice
reinvestment bill HB 3194 (2013). HB 3194 (2013) decreased mandatory minimum
sentences for several offenses, restructured transitional leave, and required agencies to
report on program effectiveness and use of EBPs. By doing this, the legislature intended to
decrease the use of prisons and jails by supporting offenders on probation and parole.
Ideally, this should translate to a decrease in prison populations, an increase in community
supervision populations, and a reduction in recidivism. The research question for this study
is: Has HB 3194 (2013) achieved its desired goals and or outcomes? To date, no
comprehensive analysis has been performed on these laws to evaluate their success in
achieving intended outcomes. By utilizing interrupted time-series analyses methods to
evaluate the bill’s intended outcome measures this study examines the effectiveness of the
legislation.

3
Literature Review
Sentencing Laws
Calls for criminal justice reform have risen as a potential antidote for the continuous
growth of both state and federal prison populations and correctional budgets. The penal
harm movement began in the 1970’s and is a particular example of this (Listwan et al.,
2008). Shaped by the political and social turmoil of the decades prior (Simon, 2017,
Monterosso, 2009), the penal harm movement developed from a multitude of factors
related to enforcement and sentencing strategy. In 1968 presidential candidate Richard
Nixon ran what is now known as the “southern strategy” to capture the votes of
conservative democrats in the south. He campaigned on a “Law and Order” platform asking
voters to reject the lawlessness of the social movements (Alexander, 2012; Thompson,
2010). In 1971 President Nixon advocated a “War on Drugs” stating that narcotics were
“public enemy number one” and that it was “necessary to wage a new, all-out offensive”
(Nixon, 1971). Nixon’s call for get-tough legislation reflected a political movement which
emerged as a response to perceived lawlessness known as popular punitivism – that is, the
relationship between politics, the media, and the public to shape crime policy (Campbell,
2015; Monterosso, 2009).
Growth of popular punitivism and the tough-on-crime movement led to truth-insentencing (TIS) laws often mandating prisoners be incarcerated for an average (across
states) of 85% of their sentence (Travis, Western &, Redburn, 2014). Soon after, the
discussion on rehabilitation and judicial discretion came to a head with Martinson’s
infamous 1974 publication insinuating that “nothing works” in correctional rehabilitation.
The report called for a more enlightened scientific approach to studying rehabilitation
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programs (Martinson, 1974), yet became a rallying cry for “get-tough” sentiments (Cullen
& Gendreau, 2001).
These events resulted in the decline of indeterminate sentencing, which includes a
judge-determined bracketed range for sentence length and a parole board that determines
the release date (Marvell and Moody, 1996). The intent was largely to ensure “just deserts”
for offenders (Shepherd, 2002). Truth-in-sentencing laws sought to increase the amount of
time violent offenders serve (to 85% of sentence) by decreasing the discretion of parole
boards and implementing determinant sentencing practices (Travis, Western &, Redburn,
2014).
Determinate sentencing allocates the near exact length of prison time as determined
by the judge without the use of parole boards, but early release is possible through good
behavior credits (Marvel & Moody, 1996). Recent studies of determinant sentencing and
TIS laws reveal that while they do deter the crimes encapsulated in legislation, a
criminogenic thermodynamic effect (Wright & Rosky, 2011) is also present. The
criminogenic thermodynamic effect occurs when offenders adapt by committing crimes
not covered by the legislation (Shepherd, 2002). System thermodynamics is similar, where
pressures (e.g. cases) placed on one part of the system are released (e.g. deciding not to
prosecute) or create different pressures in other areas deeper into the system (Wright &
Rosky, 2011). These subtle policy changes increased the length of stay for offenders and
restricted options for early release, which resulted in a long-term boost to the prison
population. During this time, the number of incarcerated people in the United States
increased from 198,800 in 1970 (Cahalan, 1986) to an estimated 503,600 in 1980 (Carson
& Anderson, 2016).

5
In 1982, President Reagan perpetuated the political surge for tough-on-crime
policies by escalating the Nixon administration’s “War on Drugs” campaign. Mandatory
minimum sentences for all drug offenses were introduced during this time (Alexander,
2012). The Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988 increased mandatory minimum
sentences for drug offenses; other critical impacts on marginalized populations include
residential evictions due to drug crimes (99th Congress, 1986). The acts jointly had several
other large effects. Federal funding for police forces to pursue drug offenses increased
dramatically: in 1981 $1.5 billion was spent, $6.6 billion in 1989 (White House, 1992), and
$15.25 billion was requested by the Obama Administration in 2017 (White House, 2016).
The use of incarceration for drug offenses has also increased. Approximately 60% of all
federal prisoners were serving time for drug related offenses by 2000, which is a substantial
rise from the 6% seen in 1979 (Pettit & Western, 2004). The number of individuals being
sentenced to prison for drug crimes in 1991 had increased nine times from 1980, and
another ten times between 1991 and 2000 (Clear, 2009)
Unintended consequences of the war on drugs include the destruction of social
cohesion in minority neighborhoods (Clear, 2009; Jensen et al., 2004; Hagan & Coleman,
2001), thus posing a threat to the success of community supervision. Hagan & Coleman
(2001) argue that the destruction of social cohesion isolates large communities from the
whole of society. As offenders are stripped of fundamental rights of citizenship the
community slowly devolves into a prison-like condition. Emphasis on surveillance and
supervision by police officers, probation and parole officers, and social workers causes
each agent to function as prison guards (Hagain & Coleman, 2001). Theories of deterrence
argue that in order to successfully deter criminals, the system must create incapacitation
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and stigma that are swift, certain, and proportionately as severe as the crime. However,
without less coercive social institutions, Lynch & Sabol (2004) suggest that as
imprisonment becomes normalized it becomes less effective. During this period
incarceration dramatically increased, rising from 503,600 prisoners in 1980 to just over
771,200 prisoners in 1989 (Carson & Anderson, 2016).
In 1992, Democrats embraced the fervor of popular punitivism by supporting threestrikes laws (Travis & Western, 2014). The State of Washington enacted the first Three
Strikes Law in 1993. In the 1994 State of the Union address President Clinton endorsed
“three-strikes laws” (Clinton, 1994). Also, in 1994, President Clinton signed into law a $30
million bill that funded mandated life sentences for third time offenders under “threestrikes” laws and expanded the number of prisons and the size of police forces (Alexander,
2012). Over the next three years 24 states enacted three-strikes laws (Austin, Clark,
Hardyman, & Henry, 1998).
These laws were aimed at violent repeat felony offenders and allocated sentences
of life without parole. Evaluations of three-strikes laws vary, yet largely conclude there is
only a marginal deterrence effect (Marvel & moody, 2001; Sorensen & Stemen, 2002).
These laws have had unintended consequences. In an evaluation of state sentencing
policies, three strikes laws were found to be most effective in incarcerating drug offenders
as opposed to violent offenders who were the primary target (Sorensen & Stemen, 2002).
Three-strikes laws, compounded with previous policy changes, added to the number
prisoners incarcerated in the United States.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates approximately 771,200 individuals were
incarcerated in 1990 (Cohen, 1991). Just before the end of the decade the estimated
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incarcerated population of the United States was over 1.4 million (Carson & Anderson,
2016). After the turn of the century and in the decade following, the incarceration
population rose above 2 million to a peak of over 2.3 million in 2008, before declining
slightly to 2.1 million in 2015 (Carson & Anderson, 2016). The era of mass incarceration
gave rise to calls for reform in the early 2000s.

Justice Reinvestment
The concept of Justice Reinvestment was first introduced (BJA, 2014) with the
November 2003 Open Society Institute publication of the monograph “Justice
Reinvestment” by Tucker and Cadora (OSI, 2003). According to the authors, the
investment should be distributed to four areas: community development, education, health,
and rehabilitation and reentry services (Tucker & Cadora, 2003). Tucker and Cadora
(2003), suggest that by investing in the communities that disproportionately feed into the
criminal justice system, recidivism can be decreased directly and indirectly by providing
rehabilitative and reentry support to the offender. Research on the predictive characteristics
of recidivism reveal that offender age, race, ethnicity, prior criminal record (Hepburn and
Albonetti, 1994), gender (Gainey et al, 2000), and risk-needs levels (Latessa and Lovins,
2010) all increase the likelihood of recidivating.
Early justice reinvestment implementations had success (BJA, 2014), suggesting it
could be a viable method of reduction. The first implementation of justice reinvestment
occurred in Connecticut in 2004 (BJA, 2014). Through collaboration with the Counsel of
State Governments (CSG) the state created legislation that reinvested approximately $13
million in 2005 into reentry programs (CSG, 2017). The goals of the law were to reduce
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the number of people on probation and parole, to create automatic parole hearings after
85% time served, and to require the implementation of evidence-based reentry programs.
The Counsel of State Governments hailed the reforms as the reason Connecticut has one
of the fastest decreasing incarcerated populations in the nation (CSG, 2017). In 2007
Texas’ Department of Corrections underwent a thorough restructuring, averting
approximately $700 million in new prison expenses and correctional costs, while
reinvesting almost $250 million into treatment and diversion programs (BJA, 2014; Orrick
& Vieraitis, 2014). Texas achieved these outcomes by redirecting savings to fund evidencebased practices for rehabilitation and support for post-prison release.
In 2010 Congress allocated funding to the BJA to create the Justice Reinvestment
Initiative (JRI) to “fund, coordinate, assess, and disseminate state and local justice
reinvestment efforts” (BJA, 2014). To date, JRI has provided services and funding to 17
states. The JRI model has seven components: 1) establish a bipartisan working group, 2)
analyze and identify cost drivers, 3) negotiate policy options to reduce costs, 4) codify
changes, 5) implementation, 6) reinvest, and 7) measure outcomes (BJA, 2014). The broad
strokes of the JRI model are intended to allow local and state stakeholders to craft the best
fitting solution to each state’s needs.
Commonly used benchmarks for justice reinvestment evaluations include
populations of incarcerated individuals under correctional control, costs of associated
practices, admissions to facilities compared to releases, bed counts, and recidivism rates
(Austin et al, 2013; BJA, 2014; Febelo et al, 2007; Bird & Grattet, 2015). These
benchmarks depend on the particular policy that was accepted by each state’s legislature
(constructed through prioritizing different outcomes as desired by competing interests in
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the political process), and therefore vary between states. Theoretically, differing
benchmarks could make state to state comparisons difficult. However, there is much to be
gained from comparing different state’s attempts in implementing justice reinvestment.
While comparing different states in their implementation of justice reinvestment is the
direction of future research, I focus here specifically on the state of Oregon. There have
been few studies evaluating the aggregate effectiveness of justice reinvestment in each
state. These studies have been conducted primarily by the BJA, CSG, and the Vera
institute. Most state evaluations report the actual numbers of recidivism and prison
populations, and report either a stabilization or decrease of these populations (CSG, 2017;
BJA, 2014). The actual data are commonly compared to projections about future behavior
of these populations based on multivariate predictions made before the implementation of
JRI. While they provide good comparisons, these analyses do not address the actual
effectiveness of JRI implementation.

Oregon House Bill 3194
Between the years 2000 and 2010, Oregon’s prison population grew from 9,491 to
13,784 inmates, an increase of nearly 45% (BJA, 2014). This is roughly the same as the
national increase in prison population which increased from 1.4 million to 2.2 million
(Carson & Anderson, 2016). In July of 2011 the Governor ordered the creation of the
Commission on Public Safety, which began the discussion to reform and curb the growing
inmate population and expenses attributed to them. In 2012, Oregon joined the Justice
Reinvestment Initiative (JRI) through the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA, 2014).
Working with officials from JRI, the commission performed an extensive review of
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criminal justice policy, practices, and costs. The joint efforts resulted in the introduction of
House Bill (HB) 3194 in February of 2013. After extensive hearings, work sessions, and
adjustments, the bill passed into law in July 2013.
The primary functions of the bill reduced mandatory minimum sentences for
marijuana offenses and for driving with a suspended license, increased transitional leave
(prior to release) from 30 to 90 days prior to discharge, and provided a comprehensive
definition of recidivism (discussed below). The bill also requires Oregon’s counties to
report their progress and financial spending for community supervision, rehabilitation
research, and evidence-based programing to the state’s Department of Justice and the
Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) for review (77th Oregon Legislative Assembly, 2013).
After review, counties can apply for the Oregon Justice Reinvestment Grant (OJRG),
which the CJC distributes to implement and support the use of evidence-based practices.
This is the reinvestment mechanism. Any funds a Department of Corrections (DOC)
agency generates at the county level as savings are placed back into the state’s general
fund, and moneys for the OJRG are then transferred back out of the general fund to the
grant, then to individual counties through the CJC.
These revisions are expected to reduce the number of incarcerated individuals in
Oregon correctional facilities (Legislative Fiscal Office, 2013). The fiscal impact report
from the Legislative Fiscal Office anticipated that the overall bed count in the Oregon
Department of Corrections (ODOC) facilities would decrease by 700 beds in the following
two years saving approximately $20 million. In turn, the legislature’s redistribution of
funds would increase the aggregate community corrections budget by $1.3 million
(Legislative Fiscal Office, 2013). Additionally, the bill invests money in a wide variety of
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programs including victim’s services, sheriff’s departments, and county recidivism
reduction efforts.
The legislation provides for flexibility such that each jurisdictional effort to
implement JRI may take shape in a variety of ways, as long as it aims to achieve the desired
goals of HB 3194. These goals, defined by the bill and the Oregon CJC, are to reduce
recidivism, decrease prison usage, and maintain public safety (CJC, 2018). One feature of
JRI is the requirement that approximately 3% of the reinvested funds should go into
evaluation research of the specific programs implemented in each county. Subsequently,
this has led to a growing number of studies examining specific programs to ensure states
are reinvesting into evidence-based practices (BJA, 2014). As large portions of resources
are devoted to program fidelity evaluation, few studies have attempted to examine the
overall effect of justice reinvestment on criminal justice populations and budgets.
There have been a few comprehensive analyses that have been performed to
examine the success of the law’s intended effects. The first, a process evaluation published
in 2015, states that the prison population has remained relatively flat since justice
reinvestment was passed, which has averted operationalizing one constructed facility and
the building of another (without the passage of HB 3194 this would have occurred in 2014).
This trend was projected to remain below the critical threshold by the end of 2017 (Schmidt
& Officer, 2015). Additionally, short term transitional leave (STTL) usage increased
between 2013 and 2015, with almost all counties using STTL (Schmidt & Officer, 2015).
Ultimately, the authors conclude that the continued success of justice reinvestment in
Oregon can be best achieved by increased and continued use of the OJR grant and EBPs
(Schmidt & Officer, 2015).
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Furthering the analysis of Oregon’s justice reinvestment, the Task Force on Public
Safety (TFPS) released an outcome evaluation that states that of all sentencing changes
made by HB 3194, STTL was the only change to achieve its projected savings. All other
sentencing changes achieved little to no savings (TFPS, 2016). The authors also assess that
the utilization of the OJR grant was slow to roll out. This is due to the ground level
implementation process of creating local task-forces to address justice reinvestment
directives, and the hiring and training of additional officers, providers, and advocates
(TFPS, 2016). They note that change in prison use has only just begun in counties that were
quick to implement HB 3194 initiatives (TFPS, 2016). Another outcome evaluation was
released in 2017. Using cost avoidance methodology, this study shows HB 3194 has
avoided almost $20 million in state DOC costs between 2013 and 2015 (Schmidt, 2017).
Furthermore, this is expected to increase to above $70 million by 2017. Local avoidance
achieved nearly $19 million in the 2013-2015 biennium and $66.6 million in the second
biennium (2015-2017). The updated 2017-2019 biennium costs suggest savings of nearly
$200 million of the DOC budget (Schmidt, 2017). In total, the updated estimated net cost
avoidance of justice reinvestment between 2013-2019 would be $254 million (Schmidt,
2017).
This study examines Oregon’s success in achieving the goals of justice
reinvestment by analyzing the change in justice system populations. No other study has
attempted an evaluation of the aggregate effectiveness of JRI reform through quasiexperimental design, thus creating a large gap in understanding the efficacy of justice
reinvestment and the Justice Reinvestment Initiative. Thus far, analysis has tended to use
prior data to project future expected outcomes. Projections made during the early stages of
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implementation may not reflect current outcome fidelity and effectiveness. This type of
reform has been attempted/implemented in seventeen states since 2011. The Bureau of
Justice Assistance’s 2014 assessment of eight states revealed that all of the states have had
a reduction in their prison populations and have had substantial savings in their corrections
budgets (BJA, 2014). However, they caution the interpretation of the results because they
are made on projected populations before the implementation of the law and state “it would
be more accurate to examine specific measures, if possible, about policy use to pinpoint a
specific JRI provision’s impact” (BJA, 2014; 38). Additionally, there have been no external
evaluations (research not conducted by BJA, CSG, Vera) as the time of this writing. This
study adds to and addresses this gap in research by evaluating the effectiveness of Oregon’s
justice reinvestment bill HB 3194 (2013).

14
Methods
Time Series in Policy Research
In order to analyze the effect of the HB 3194 (2103), advanced quasi-experimental
statistical methods are needed that can account for changes over time. There are multiple
ways to address policy effectiveness, including forecasting, ordinary least squares
regression analyses (Berry & Lewis-Beck, 1986), and interrupted time series analysis
(ITSA) (Cook & Campbell, 1979; McDowall et. al, 1980, McCleary et. al, 2017). The
interrupted time series quasi-experiment was suggested by Campbell and Stanley (1966)
as a form of accounting for historical trends to derive the impact of an intervention on
longitudinal data. Time series data are analyzed by the introduction of the intervention,
which can produce significant trend or level change (Ramirez and Crano, 2003). To
increase validity, an event can be tested by utilizing multiple outcome variables. If the
introduction of the independent variable (the intervention) does not produce effects across
all dependent variables, the significant changes observed in outcome variables are thought
to be associated with a third, unknown factor rather than the intervention (Ramirez and
Crano, 2003). This method has been used in the study of interventions across multiple
disciplines. Common applications include pharmacology, psychology, public health, and
education policy evaluation.
In the field of criminal justice, it can be used for both the evaluation of policy and
treatment programs. Jensen and Metsger (1994) employed ITS analysis to review the
impact of juvenile waivers to adult court in Idaho. To increase validity, the researchers
compared Idaho against Wyoming and Montana (Jensen & Metsger, 1994). Ramirez and
Crano (2003) evaluated California’s three-strikes law, spanning the period from 1983
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through 1998. The researchers used two ITSA techniques for three separate analyses. The
first assumed an immediate impact model and the second assumed a gradual impact model
using the McDowall (1980) methods. The third analysis used the OLS regression technique
by Berry and Lewis-Beck (1986). With McDowall impact models they found that the
California three-strikes law had no significant impact on all of the dependent variables.
The third analysis, proposed by Berry and Lewis-Beck (1986) combines ITSA with OLS
regression to prevent the possible inflation of type II error. This analysis concluded that
the three-strikes laws did have a significant impact on violent and minor crime rates
(Ramirez & Crano, 2003).
Design
By utilizing interrupted time-series analyses on the bill’s intended outcome
measures, I evaluate the main research question: Has HB 3194 achieved its goals of
decreasing supervision outcomes by reducing incarcerated populations and increasing
community supervision populations? According to HB 3194, the Oregon Criminal Justice
Commission (CJC) is charged with collecting information and data on, and determining if,
counties are implementing evidence-based practices. The CJC utilizes this information to
distribute the Oregon Justice Reinvestment Grant (OJRG). This grant is used to initiate and
support counties’ development of evidence-based practices. This redistribution process is
expected to have several impacts, which provide the basis for this study’s hypotheses.
Hypotheses
On a global scale, HB 3194 intends to shift individuals away from custody
institutions to probation or parole supervision. As suggested by the legislation, the count
of people in custody supervision should generally be in decline after the implementation
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of HB 3194 (2013). House Bill 3194 was intended to decrease the amount of temporary
and emergency beds utilized by all DOC and county facilities (i.e. prisons and jails) by 700
in the 2013 – 2015 biennium, and by an additional 840 beds through the 2015 – 2017
biennium. The bill’s intended outcome is a decrease of roughly 1,500 beds by the end of
June 2017 (Legislative Fiscal Office, 2013). Therefore:
H1 – After the introduction of HB 3194, prison admissions will decrease.
The release of individuals from custody control to community supervision, where
evidence-based practices are required by HB 3194, could result in community supervision
populations increasing. More effective programing would have the suggested effect of less
recidivism, and therefore more individuals remaining on community supervision.
Additionally, justice reinvestment is used to divert offenders to community supervision.
One way to capture this is by measuring individuals who receive a presumptive prison
sentence but are diverted to probation instead. This is captured by probation admissions.
People already in prison or on probation prior to the law’s enactment do not fall in the
jurisdiction of justice reinvestment or will be picked up later in measurements of recidivism
or a future probation admission. This leads to the next two hypotheses:
H2 – After the introduction of HB 3194, probation admissions will increase.
H3 – After the introduction of HB 3194, the community supervision
populations for probation and parole will increase.
Data
Data collected to analyze the effect of HB 3194 (2103) are deidentified monthly
aggregated data provided by the senior research analyst at the Oregon Criminal Justice
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Commission. The Oregon CJC has been tasked by the legislature to collect county prison
and community supervision data for research, and to ensure the counties are utilizing the
funds appropriately. These data sets include: monthly prison admissions for first sentences
and parole revocation, monthly probation admissions, and the 2010 and 2013 custody
release cohorts. These data sets were selected for the State of Oregon and the three counties
in this study.
Because HB 3194 creates overarching changes to the funding and practices of
justice agencies, the current study aimed to conduct an overall state evaluation of the
outcome measures. A state-wide analysis can provide a general evaluation of the law, but
Type II error is at risk because actual results could be over- or under-powered by large
counties. For example, Oregon has 36 counties, of which Multnomah County (Portland)
contains the largest population: approximately 800,000 people (200,000 more than the
second largest county, U.S. Census, 2017). A simple state-wide analysis could produce
results that were dominated by such a large population center. The reverse is equally
possible: if no other county implemented, a simple statewide aggregation of data from a
population of about 4,000,000 could indicate no effect despite Multnomah’s full
implementation of justice reinvestment. Studying all counties for these measures would
produce the most accurate depiction of JR in Oregon; however, this is beyond the scope of
this study.
This study utilizes three counties as proxies to represent different levels of
implementation. As the tables C1 – C3 (appendix) show, the three proxy counties have
similar rates for the measures used in this study. The rates were constructed by collecting
U.S. Census population estimates for each year (2010 - 2016) for the state and proxy
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counties. Mean values were calculated for the measures in this study by year and divided
by the political unit’s (i.e. the state of Oregon or counties) estimated population for each
year. The low and medium usage counties have similar mean rates of prison admissions,
probation admissions, and community supervision populations per year compared to the
high usage proxy and the state rates. Therefore, it is important to understand the effects of
the law on counties that have medium and low usage of the OJR grant.
Furthermore, person and property crime rates have been generally in decline over
the last 20 years but have been slowly increasing since 2010 (CJC Interactive Data, 2018).
The high usage proxy’s crime rates have been increasing since 2010 as well. In the medium
and low usage proxies, behavior, person, and property crime rates have been declining
since 2011 (CJC Interactive Data, 2018). Also over this period, the population of Oregon
has increased by 6%. The population in the high usage county has increased by 8% between
2010 and 2016. The medium usage county’s population increased by 15% and the low
usage county’s population increased by 2%.
As individual counties could have created or funded their own programs that are
evidence-based prior to or after the introduction of HB 3194, a proxy measure was created
to rank county adoption. This measure includes a count per county of the amount of
programming subtypes for which the county had received funds as of October 2017, as a
representation for the use of the justice reinvestment grant and implementation
commitment. The CJC has divided the areas of funding into seven categories, containing
20 subtypes. The seven categories are: supervision and sanctions, treatment, transition
services, victim services, offender services, program management and support, jail pretrial release, and restitution (OCJC, 2017). For example, the offender services category
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includes the subtypes: education, employment, parenting, mentoring, and outreach (OCJC,
2017). One county represents the largest use of reinvestment funds (high usage), one
represents moderate use of funds (moderate usage), and one represents the least amount of
funding usage (low usage). The high usage county proxy receives funding for 12
programing subtypes; the medium usage county currently receives funds for seven
subtypes; and the low usage county currently receives funding for two subtypes (OCJC,
2017). Additionally, counties were selected to have proportional rankings of population
within the category of subtypes that were used to select the low, medium and high proxies.
The selection of the three counties based on grant usage could be unintentionally
influenced by population. If county usage of the OJR grant is based on population size
(which can influence crime rates) then usage of the grant then becomes a proxy for
population. However, there is variance in the population growth and crime rates in each
political unit and there are similar rates of measures utilized in this study. As table A1
shows, population does not determine the number of subtypes a for which a county will
receive funding. Therefore, creating proxies by subtype use provides an accurate measure
of justice reinvestment implementation. Additionally, the low usage county was allocated
funding for two program subtypes in the 2015-2017 biennium but was awarded funding
for 7 programming subtypes in the 2017-2019 biennium (accommodating for changes
between bienniums is outside the range of this study).
For the state and selected counties, this design measures the dependent variables
before the intervention of HB 3194 and the effects of the intervention on the outcome
measures afterwards. Three years of pre-intervention (June 2010 – June 2013) data and
three years of post-intervention (July 2013 – July 2016) data were analyzed to reveal the
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changes to community correctional populations and prison admissions. Each of these
dependent variables require their own analysis because they are outcome goals of the
intervention of HB 3194 (2013) and multiple outcome variables cannot be tested
simultaneously.

Dependent Variables
Dependent variables in interrupted time series analyses are the measure for which
the intervention may have an effect. Each of the measures are used as proxy variables that
have been used in prior research either together or individually to assess treatment
programs. Rather than measure the aggregated totals of prison populations, I study
admissions to isolate the effect of the law’s implementation. The total number of
individuals admitted to prison are analyzed by aggregating all admissions types. Using
count data for this study actively seeks to measure that actual change in each political unit.
The language of HB 3194 directly calls for counts to be measured in regards to beds and
prison populations. Additionally, this study is not attempting to compare counties to one
another, to which rates would be essential. This is the direction of future research but is
beyond the scope of this study.
Prison Admissions (H1). Admissions data are used to isolate the effect of the law’s
effect on the prison population. The total number of individuals admitted to prison per
month, prison admissions, is comprised of first sentences and revocations and include all
the subcategories that are codified under Oregon law. These subcategories are: property,
driving, drug possession, drug, person, sex, and other.
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Property crimes. This refers to all individuals convicted for crimes listed in ORS
137.717: attempt or actual theft (1st and 2nd degree), aggravated theft (1st degree),
unauthorized use of a vehicle, mail theft, burglary (1st and 2nd degree), criminal mischief
(1st and 2nd degree), computer crime, forgery (1st and 2nd degree), criminal possession of
a forged instrument (1st and 2nd degree), fraudulent use of a credit card, identity theft,
possession of a stolen vehicle, and trafficking in stolen vehicles.
Driving. Defined under ORS 811.182 as: a suspensions defined under ORS 809.411
(suspension for conviction of crime), ORS 809.409 (revocation for conviction of crime),
ORS 813.410 (suspension upon receipt of police report on implied consent test): 0.08
percent or more by weight if the person was not driving a commercial motor vehicle; 0.04
percent or more by weight if the person was driving a commercial motor vehicle; or any
amount if the person was under 21 years of age, a suspension of commercial driving
privileges under, a suspension of commercial driving privileges under ORS 809.510
(conviction of crime), a suspension of commercial driving privileges under ORS 809.520
(lifetime suspension of commercial driving privileges), a revocation resulting from
habitual offender status under ORS 809.640 (procedures on habitual offender
determination), a suspension resulting from any crime punishable as a felony, a suspension
for failure to perform the duties of a driver under ORS 811.705 (failure to perform duties
of driver to injured persons), a suspension for reckless driving under ORS 811.140
(reckless driving), a suspension for fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer under
ORS 811.540 (fleeing or attempting to elude police officer), a suspension or revocation
resulting from misdemeanor driving while under the influence of intoxicants under ORS
813.010 (driving under the influence of intoxicants).
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Drug possession. Defined between ORS 475.752 to 475.935 and includes
possession of all controlled narcotics.
Drug. Defined as manufacturing of all controlled narcotics between 475.752 to
475.935.
Person. Identified under Oregon law as assault, homicide, robbery, and kidnapping
(except robbery 3 ORS 164.395 which is under property).
Sex. Defined as all crimes included in the categories of: rape, sodomy, and sex
abuse and other sex crime.
Other. This is a net variable that includes all other crimes; includes failure to
appear, failure to register as a sex offender, weapon use, felon with a weapon, and all other
crimes not classified in categories above.
Probation Admissions (H2). The total number of individuals admitted to probation
per month is also comprised of the subcategories encompassing all violations of Oregon
law. These subcategories are identical to the prison admissions subcategories.
Community Supervision (H3). The community supervision populations variable
has been constructed by aggregating probation and parole populations by release date by
month. The data span from July 2010 to December 2015 as recidivism and release data is
collected by cohort (2010 and 2013 cohorts).
The Independent Variable
HB 3194. The primary independent variable in interrupted time series analyses is
the introduction of an intervention. For this study, the date House Bill 3194 (2013) was
enrolled, July 2013, is the intervention. Enrollment is the date on which the law was passed
by both houses. This is separate from roll out, which is the process of implementation.
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There are several ways to create the dummy variable describing the impact of the
intervention, for ITS analysis. McDowall (1980) describes four ways an intervention can
manifest as a time series: abrupt and permanent effect, gradual and permanent effect, abrupt
and temporary effect, or gradual and temporary effect. Of these, three are not appropriate
for this study. It is unlikely the bill had an immediate impact on the date of implementation
(July 25th, 2013), which excludes both abrupt and permanent, and abrupt and temporary
models (McDowall, 1980). This lag is due to the time required to evaluate programs, time
needed by CJC to create the infrastructure to distribute funds, and the time needed to
implement evidence-based practices in new locations. CJC needing time to create the
infrastructure to distribute funds, and the implementation of evidence-based practices in
new locations.
The gradual and temporary style of impact, one that increases slowly then
decreases, is unlikely because the bill has not been repealed and does not have an automatic
repeal measure contained within it. Additionally, as this bill received bi-partisan support
to keep the state from having to open another prison, county level buy-in is expected to not
decrease. Furthermore, because the state is providing funds to counties for adoption there
is an incentive to continue to utilize the components of HB 3194. Therefore, gradual and
permanent impact intervention on the dependent variables is suggested to be the most
accurate type of impact justice reinvestment will have on the dependent measures. The
dependent time series might exhibit a minor abrupt change due to the restructuring of the
classification of crimes, but the long-term effect of justice reinvestment is the funding of
evidence-based practices. This suggests a gradual change in the dependent measures
(McDowall, 1980).
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Analytical Plan
Interrupted time series. According to McDowall, time series data are often
skewed and non-normal; they originate from random shocks of data with three types of
noise: trend and drift, seasonality, and random error (McDowall, 1980). Trend, drift, and
seasonality are non-stationary processes. Trend is the general movement of the data away
from its starting point throughout time and drift is movement of the time series in large
swings about the starting point (McCleary, 2017). Seasonal data is the periodic, or regularly
repeated, variation in the data over time (McDowall, 1980). Traditional interrupted time
series analysis requires the time series to be stationary. Stationary time series are fully
determined by their mean and autocovariance (McCleary, 2017). The ARIMA function can
be used to remove noise due to error and non-stationarity.
Developing the noise component for the ITSA technique is an iterative process that
begins with data evaluation. The time series is evaluated by examining the autocorrelation
function (ACF) and the partial autocorrelation function (PACF) (McDowall, 1980). The
ACF tests for autocorrelation in an autoregressive process, the PACF tests for
autocorrelation in the moving average process (McDowall, 1980). Autoregression is serial
correlation of one observation with all previous observations (Cook & Campbell, 1979).
Moving average samples have a direct correlation with the immediately preceding
observation (Cook & Campbell, 1979). Both AR and MA time series are stationary, as is
white noise (McCleary, 2017). Having autocorrelation in the time series can inflate t
statistics (McDowall, 1980), therefore removing any autocorrelation is crucial.
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The goal of an interrupted time series analysis is to develop a model consisting of
a linear combination of residual noise and a description of the impact due to the
intervention. The complete intervention-impact model is represented by:
Yt = f(It) + Nt

1.1

where Yt is a realization of the time series, Nt is the Gaussian distributed stochastic noise
and f(It) is the transfer function describing the impact of the intervention.
Interrupted time series analysis utilizes a two-step statistical procedure to identify
the noise component: ACFs and PACFs are computed for random shocks of real world
observations (such as numerical counts of inmates per month in a prison). These allow the
analyst to estimate the order of ARIMA function to remove noise. The autoregressive
integrated moving average (ARIMA) function produces the stochastic component Nt
(McDowall, 1980). ACFs and PACFs are then computed for this component. If the results
are a good fit, the stochastic component Nt is ready for modeling. If not, another pass
through the ARIMA function is required. This process is repeated until the residuals have
a normal distribution with zero mean and finite variance (Shumway, 2009; McCleary,
2017).
The ARIMA process has three structural parameters: p, d, and q, expressed as
(p,d,q). The parameter p represents the order of the autoregressive relationship, ϕ, which
can be expressed as:
∞

𝑁𝑡 = ∑ 𝜙1𝑖 𝑎𝑡−𝑖

1.2

𝑖=0

where ϕ1 is the weight attributed to a random shock, a(t), over time. The time series
observations consist of the sum of the shocks, weighted in fractions and degraded over time
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until the end of the series. Effectively this means that for any given observation, the
observation immediately preceding it has the most impact on the current observation, and
the farthest observation has the least impact (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). For example, if
ϕ = .5, the value of the most recent prior sample is halved, but the sample prior to that is
quartered. This ARIMA process is expressed as ARIMA (p,0,0). The purpose of the (p,0,0)
model is to remove the autoregressive relationship from the time series. Ultimately, this
filtering process removes the influence of all previous observations from the current
observation.
Trend is the movement of the observations in one direction, either up or down. With
drift, the observations “walk” both up and down over time (McDowall, 1980, McCleary,
2017). The structural parameter d addresses the non-stationary components, trend and drift,
in the data by differencing the time series. Parameter d indicates the order of lag between
observations. In a given time-series, the first shock is the sum of all historical shocks not
accounted for in the data. A random shock enters a filter where a constant is added and it
is integrated (summed) with all previous shocks (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). This can be
expressed as:
∞

𝑁𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎𝑡−𝑖

1.3

𝑖=0

where at are successive random shocks and Nt is a realization of the sum of the previous
shock subtracted from the current shock for each time step. Differencing is performed by
subtracting the first observation from the second, the second from the third, and so on. This
is expressed as ARIMA (0,d,0). This form of filtering makes the data stable so it can be
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analyzed through its residuals. However, because the regression model (discussed below)
uses trend to estimate parameters, differencing will not be utilized.
The structural parameter q represents the serial dependency of a moving average
relationship (McDowall et. al, 1980). In this case the preceding shock is used to predict the
current observation:
𝑁𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡 − 𝜃1 𝑎𝑡−1

1.4

where 𝜃 is constrained by the bounds of invertibility (-1 < 𝜃 < +1), expressed as ARIMA
(0,0,q) (McDowall, 1980, McCleary, 2017). Filtering the moving average from data
removes the influence of the previous observation from the current observation.
ARIMA processes may be conceptualized as raw data passing through a series of
filters in order to produce a time series observation (Campbell & Stanley, 1963).
Additionally, ARIMA models can also control for seasonality in the data, where the data
behaves cyclically. The seasonality process is relatively the same as p, d, and q models.
For example, given a seasonal moving average model of monthly data, where the current
month observation is related to the month in the previous year. Then:
𝑁t = 𝑎𝑡 − 𝜃12 𝑎𝑡−12

1.5

where we account for a lagged relationship of 12 months. These models are expressed as
ARIMA (p,d,q)(P,D,Q)s (McDowall, 1980; McCleary, 2017). For these processes, the
lowercase parameters indicate sequential values of autocorrelation or differencing and the
uppercase values indicate seasonality followed by the s value which indicates the repeat
period.
Once the noise model, Nt, has been adequately described it is combined with the
intervention-impact transfer function to evaluate the efficacy of the intervention. The
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intervention component It, a dummy variable (frequently a step function), is used to assess
impact (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). The transfer function for the gradual and permanent
impact model can be written as:
f(It) = (δyt-1 + ωIt)

1.6

where δ is a scalar effecting the trend and ω is the correlation coefficient describing the
change in mean. Plugging the transfer function into equation (1.1) yields the gradual and
permanent model:
Yt = (δyt-1 + ωIt) + Nt

1.7

where Nt is the ARIMA (p,d,q)(P,D,Q) model, and the transfer function for It (0 or 1)
represents the presence of the intervention component. Prior to the intervention, It = 0, and
after the intervention, It = 1. The intervention component is then combined with impact
patterns to produce the assessment. For the gradual permanent impact pattern described in
equation 1.6, ω represents the estimate of the difference between pre-level and post-level,
and δ represents an estimate of the change in trend.
I use generalized least squares regression analysis to determine the coefficients for
changes in trend and mean to model the impact of the intervention on the post time series
(Berry and Lewis-Beck, 1986). Regression analysis has been used in many interrupted time
series studies (e.g. Sundt et. al, 2016; Ramirez & Crano, 2003; Jensen & Metsger, 1994;
Simonton, 1977).
The Berry and Lewis-Beck method of analysis requires several assumptions. These
assumptions include no specification error, absence of measurement error, absence of
perfect multicollinearity of independent variables, homoscedasticity, absence of
autocorrelation, and that data are normally distributed (Berry and Lewis-Beck, 1989; 220).
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Specification error occurs when both the independent variable is nonlinearly related to the
dependent variable and irrelevant independent variables are included in the model (Berry
& Lewis-Beck, 1989). The independent variables in the regression model for this study are
time, impact and trend. Time is a sequence counter beginning with 1 at the first time point
and increasing by 1 at each step to the last observation. Impact, coded with the variable
name Ilevel, represents It which has the value zero before the intervention and 1 at the
intervention and thereafter for each time point. Trend is a sequence counter beginning with
1 at the intervention and increasing by 1 at each time step to the last observation, and 0
before the intervention. The model variables of time, impact, and trend are all linearly
related and relevant independent variables; therefore, the assumption of no specification
error is met.
Multicollinearity is the inclusion of two or more variables in a model that are highly
correlated. In interrupted time series, this is an issue within multiple ITS, as an event may
occur at the same time as another event that may affect the dependent variable (Berry &
Lewis-Beck, 1989). This assumption is met because the data are not affected by any other
major changes to Oregon’s criminal justice system (through law) in the 2013 legislative
session, and therefore no other event will be included in the model. No homoscedasticity
is a condition such that all vectors have the same finite variance (Field, 2013). As there are
no other independent variables included in this analysis, homoscedasticity is not an issue.
Normality tests were performed on all measures and are included in appendix B. To correct
non-normal data, filtering the data through AR and MA processes makes the data normally
distributed. Autocorrelation is the greatest threat to regression modeling with time series
data because it invalidates the coefficient significance tests and can inflate the t-ratio 300-
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400% (McDowall, 1980: 13). Autocorrelation is removed from the model by using AR or
MA processes in the GLS regression.
The method of model evaluation and fit is an iterative one. First, identification
(based on ACF and PACF) guides model selection. The parameters 𝜃 (AR) and 𝜙 (MA)
are estimated through the ARIMA process, and if the estimations are not statistically
significant the researcher must select a new model (identification) (McDowall, 1980).
Additionally, the model can be assessed by evaluating Q after applying the Ljung-Box test
(McCleary, 2017). Q statistics that fail to reach significance at p< .05 reject the null
hypothesis that the residuals of the ARIMA process are not different from white noise and
the model is therefore acceptable (McCleary, 2017). If the conditions are not met, one must
return to identification. Once these conditions are met the ARIMA analysis is appropriate
and the model is accepted. For the ITSA method (Cook & Campbell, 1979; McDowall et.
al, 1980, and McCleary et. al, 2017) all parameters (𝜃, 𝜙, δ, ω) must obtain significance
for the intervention to have had an effect on the outcome measures. Here, I use the ARIMA
process to estimate autocorrelation and to determine the p and q parameters for the GLS
regression model. The generalized least squares (GLS) regression is fit by maximum
likelihood estimation with ARMA parameters determined by the previous ARIMA model.
GLS regression accounts for correlation terms inside the model (Fox & Weisberg, 2010)
as opposed to performing an OLS regression and manually calculating new coefficients
with the AR and MA parameters (Lewis-Beck, 1980). The formula for the single
intervention regression is:
Yt = b0 + b1X1t + b2X2t + b3X3t

1.8
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where Yt = the individual time series observations of the dependent variable, Xit = time, the
counter from 1 to the end of the time series, X2t = Level, the dummy variable signifying
the presence of the intervention, and X3t = trend, the time counter beginning at the point
the intervention has started (Lewis-Beck, 1980). A counterfactual can be calculated from
the intercept (b0) and the slope of the pre-intervention period (b1) and projected into the
post intervention period. This models what the data might look like if the intervention had
not occurred. By taking the last value of the counterfactual and the last value of the fitted
data, the absolute and relative change can be calculated. These formulas are:
Absolute = 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑁 − 𝑐𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑁
Relative =

𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑁 −𝑐𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑁
𝑐𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑁

1.9

∗ 100

1.10

If the absolute and relative change are positive, there has been an increase in that
population. If they are negative, there has been a decrease. The result of this analysis is
compared to the projected outcomes hypothesized by the enrolled bill and the Justice
Reinvestment Initiative for the effectiveness of the legislation. The estimated total change
is calculated as:
𝑛

𝑛

Estimated Total Change = ∑ 𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑡 − ∑ 𝐶𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡
𝑡=1

1.11

𝑡=1

where t = the first month in the post period, n = the last month in the post period, Fitt =
the trend fitted to the post-data from the GLS regression model, and Cfact = the
projection of the pre-data trend. The estimated total change is calculated by first summing
the change in trend per month for the counterfactual post period, then summing the
change in trend per month for the impacted post intervention period (the fitted values),
then differencing the counterfactual from the fitted.
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Table 1. State of Oregon Descriptive Statistics by Year
Mean Rate
Prison
% Change
N Std. Deviation Mean
Per 100,000
Admissions
10.15
389.43
25.409
7
2010
10.03
387.83 -0.41%
32.879
12
2011
10.22
2.60%
397.92
33.571
12
2012
10.52
3.64%
412.42
27.767
12
2013
10.00
396.25 -3.92%
36.581
12
2014
10.09
2.23%
405.08
31.644
12
2015
9.49
387.86 -4.25%
39.245
7
2016
Probation
Admissions
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

N Std. Deviation
7
12
12
12
12
12
7

28.652
50.389
86.473
49.001
52.762
38.924
54.381

Mean
894.43
902.83
909.67
901.83
964.17
919.25
911.00

% Change
0.94%
0.76%
-0.86%
6.91%
-4.66%
-0.90%

Mean Rate
Per 100,000
23.31
23.35
23.36
23.01
24.34
22.89
22.30

Mean Rate
Community
N Std. Deviation Mean % Change
Per 100,000
Supervision
30.35
1164.50
31.552
6
2010
30.07
1162.58 -0.16%
61.926
12
2011
30.21
1176.50 1.20%
92.131
12
2012
29.71
1164.67 -1.01%
65.643
12
2013
30.67
1214.92 4.31%
73.494
12
2014
29.25
1175.00 -3.29%
61.045
12
2015
Note: Population data was collected from the U.S. Census (U.S.
Census, 2018)

Table 1.A Yearly Mean Rates by Measure and Political
Unit (Descriptive Statistics Tables)
Prison Admission
Year State High Usage Med Usage Low Usage
10.24
10.23
10.29
2010 10.15
4.10
8.81
10.46
2011 10.03
8.99
9.53
11.08
2012 10.22
9.35
8.89
11.19
2013 10.52
7.51
10.48
9.32
2014 10.00
10.81
9.86
8.82
2015 10.09
9.42
9.93
8.88
2016 9.49
Year
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

23.31
23.35
23.36
23.01
24.34
22.89
22.30

Probation Admission
31.59
20.75
25.19
21.23
24.31
20.88
25.02
21.60
28.60
21.13
25.82
17.52
22.93
17.74

32.59
33.05
25.50
30.71
41.96
30.90
31.44

Community Supervision
Year
34.29
33.90
31.98
2010 30.35
28.95
28.32
32.50
2011 30.07
30.00
25.86
30.59
2012 30.21
33.36
27.84
30.53
2013 29.71
36.74
31.63
30.54
2014 30.67
32.37
27.01
26.36
2015 29.25
Note: Population data was collected from the U.S. Census
(U.S. Census, 2018)

Analytical Tools
I used the R statistical platform and the R programming language (R Core Team,
2017) for all analyses in this study. Functions contained in the base package of R that are
used for analyses are: lm, used to model initial OLS regression statistics for the raw data;
arima, used to perform ARIMA filtering; box.test, which calculates the Q statistics; acf is
used to create ACF and PACF plots; and plot, which is used to create all other plots.
Additional packages used include lmtest, which contains coefficient testing for the
regression analyses (Zeileis & Hothorn, 2002), and nlme (linear and nonlinear mixed
effects models) for performing the GLS regression with ARMA parameters (Pinheiro et.
al., 2018).

26.32 (25)
p- = 0.39
15.17 (25)
p = .94
20.49 (25)
p = .72
20.86 (25)
p = 0.70
22.73 (25)
p = 0.59
25.73 (25)
p = 0.42
7.54 (25)
p = 0.99
28.78 (25)
p = 0.27
24.93 (25)
p = 0.46

High Usage County
Prison Admissions (1,0,3)

High Usage County
Probation Admissions (0,1,1)

High Usage County
Community Supervision (0,0,0)

Medium Usage County
Prison Admissions (0,0,0)

Medium Usage County
Probation Admissions (0,0,0)

Medium Usage County
Community Supervision (1,0,1)

Low Usage County
Prison Admissions (0,0,0)

Low Usage County
Probation Admissions (0,0,0)

Low Usage County
Community Supervision (0,0,0)

Note: ar = autoregressive parameter, ma = moving average parameter
Signif. codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1

ar1 = 0.86 (0.11)
Z = 7.79 ***

ma1 = -0.75 (0.08)
Z = -9.57 ***

ma1 = -0.77 (0.08)
Z = -9.30 ***

ar1 = 0.89 (0.07)
Z = 13.43 ***

35.861 (25) ar1 = -0.601 (0.134)
p = .07
Z = -4.49 ***

State
Community Supervision (2,0,3)

Parameter Estimate
(Standard Error)
Z-value
ar1 = -1.18 (0.01)
Z = -85.59 ***

31.526 (25) ar1 = 1.575 (0.201)
p = .17
Z = 7.84 ***

Q-Value
(df)
p-value
29.53 (25)
p = .24

State
Probation Admissions (2,0,2)

State
Prison Admissions (2,0,2)

Dependent Time Series
ARIMA Model

Table 2. ARIMA model Paramater Estimates and Q Fit

ma1 = -0.71 (0.14)
Z = -5.09 ***

ma1 = -0.69 (0.12)
Z = -5.72 ***

ar2 = -0.688 (0.100)
Z = -6.88 ***

ar2 = -0.842 (0.153)
Z = -5.49 ***

Parameter Estimate
(Standard Error)
Z-value
ar2 = -0.99 (0.01)
Z = -288.64 ***

ma2 = -0.39 (0.10)
Z = -3.67 ***

ma1 = 0.640 (0.171)
Z = 3.75 ***

ma1 = -1.608 (0.119)
Z = -13.51 ***

Parameter Estimate
(Standard Error)
Z-value
ma1 = 1.21 (0.06)
Z = 20.43 ***

ma3 = 0.47 (0.11)
Z = 4.16 ***

ma2 = 1.10 (0.19)
Z = 5.54 ***

ma2 = 0.999 (0.062)
Z = 16.04 ***

Parameter Estimate
(Standard Error)
Z-value
ma2 = 0.99 (0.08)
Z = 11.76 ***

ma3 = 0.36 (0.17)
Z = 2.05 *

Parameter Estimate
(Standard Error)
Z-value
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Results
The high usage county utilizes the OJR grant for 12 program subtypes. The high
usage proxy also processes the most individuals of the counties in this study (see Table
C1). The medium usage county utilizes the OJR grant for seven program subtypes and has
jurisdiction over smaller criminal justice populations than high usage county (Table C2).
The low usage county uses grant funding for two program subtypes and has very small
custody and community supervision populations (Table C3) when compared to both the
high usage and the medium usage counties. However, because the rates are similar, this
suggests that each of the proxy counties is affected by similar prison and probation
admissions and individuals on community supervision. Because there is an unequal
distribution of programing subtypes receiving funds in the proxy counties, the existence of
justice reinvestment might have different outcomes in the three proxy counties.
H1 - After the introduction of HB 3194, prison admissions will decrease.
The plots of ACF and PACF of the raw State of Oregon prison admission data show
serial autocorrelation for both the autoregressive and moving average processes. The
ARIMA process provided the best fit with an ARIMA (2,0,2) model where all
autoregressive and moving average terms are statistically significant (shown in Table 3)
and the model residuals were not different than white noise (p = 0.24). The GLS regression
by maximum likelihood with correlation ARMA (2,2) coefficients are shown in Table 4.
This produced an intercept of 381.23, a positive slope of 0.691, an immediate decrease at
the time of intervention of 1.17 (p= 0.837) that was not significant, and a significant change
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Figure 1. State of Oregon Prison Admissions by Month, June 2010 to July 2016

between the pre-slope and the post-slope of -1.0169 (p < 0.001) is observed. This results
in the post slope being -.325. The pre-trend indicates increasing prison admissions before
the intervention, and after the intervention the count of people being admitted to prison
starts to decline. This suggests that HB 3194 has had a significant effect on prison
admissions for the state. Modeling the counterfactual (if there had been no intervention),
there has been a decrease of 37.8 individuals not being admitted to prison by July 2016.
The estimated total change over the post intervention period is a decrease of 640
admissions to the prison system statewide, supporting the hypothesis.
For the high usage county’s prison admission raw data (Figure 2), ACF and PACF
showed serial autocorrelation. This was best filtered by an ARIMA (1,0,3) model, where
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Table 3. Hypothesis 1, Regression Coefficients and Absolute & Relative Change
Dependent Time Series (ARMA Model)
State of Oregon
Prison Admissions (2,2)
Value
(Std. Error)
t-value
381.22
(3.55)
107.17 ***
0.69
(0.17)
3.97 ***
-1.17
(5.74)
-0.20
-1.01
(0.19)
-5.17 ***

Dependent Time Series (ARMA Model)
High Usage County
Prison Admissions (1,3)
Value
(Std. Error)
t-value
74.10
(3.84)
19.28 ***
0.37
(0.17)
2.19 *
-8.38
(4.81)
-1.74
-0.75
(0.25)
-2.95 **

Regression
Coefficients

Intercept
Time
Ilevel
Trend

Change

Absolute
Relative
Total

-37.8
-8.74%
-670

-35.6
-34.9%
-778

Regression
Coefficients

Intercept
Time
Ilevel
Trend

Medium Usage County
Prison Admissions (0,0)
Value
(Std. Error)
t-value
14.78
(1.36)
10.86 ***
0.02
(0.06)
0.45
-0.78
(1.88)
-0.41
0.07
(0.08)
0.79

Low Usage County
Prison Admissions (0,0)
Value
(Std. Error)
t-value
1.50
(0.48)
3.09 *
0.004
(0.02)
0.22
0.55
(0.67)
0.82
-008
(0.03)
-0.25

Change

Absolute
Relative
Total

1.76
10.4%
21

0.26
14.2%
15

Signif. codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1

are AR and MA parameters were significant (Table 2). The residuals from the ARIMA
(1,0,3) model were not different from white noise (X2 = 26.323, df = 25, p = 0.390).
Therefore, I conclude this model best filters the raw data. The GLS regression with ARMA
(1,3) produced an intercept of 74.103, a pre-intervention slope of 0.375, a non-significant
immediate change in level at the time of intervention of -8.380 (p = 0.086), and a significant
change in slope of -0.755 (p = 0.004) which yields a post slope of -0.38. As can be seen in
figure 3, there is a substantial change in slope between the pre and post periods. Prior to
HB 3194 prison admissions were increasing at a rate of .375. After the passage of HB 3194
(2013) there is a decreasing trend. Although there appears to be a drop directly after the
bill’s enactment, this is not significant. The absolute change at the end of the study period
is a decrease in admissions for the high usage county of 35.6 (-34.9%) individuals. Between
July 2013 and July 2016, the estimated total change in prison admissions in the high usage
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Figure 2. The High Usage County Prison Admissions by Month, June 2010 to July 2016

county was a decrease of 778 individuals, which supports the hypotheses and is in concert
with the State result.
The medium usage county prison admissions did not contain autocorrelation. The
Box-Ljung test revealed that the residuals from an ARIMA (0,0,0) were not different from
white noise (X2 = 20.86, df = 25, p = 0.700) so the model is accepted. GLS regression
without AR or MA parameters coefficients (Table 3) are an intercept of 14.783, a pre-slope
of 0.028, a non-significant immediate change in level of -0.783 (p = 0.679), and a nonsignificant change in pre-slope (0.028) and post-slope (0.099) of 0.070 (p = 0.426). The
regression reveals that prison admissions in the medium usage county were gradually
increasing before the intervention, and despite a slight dip in level at the intervention, the
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overall rate of prison admissions stays about the same through July 2016. The absolute
change in July 2016 between the fitted values and the projection of the pre-intervention
trend is an increase of 1.76 (10.4%) individuals. The estimated total change over the post
intervention period is an increase of 21 admissions to prison from the medium usage
county. This finding does not support H1.
There were sections of the data missing in the prison admissions data sets of the
low usage county. The missing months are assumed to be months were no individuals were
admitted to prison in order to maintain the uniform spacing of the time series. Because the
base rate of the low usage county is small it is possible that the county saw no prison
admissions. However, this could be an absence of reporting; and therefore, filling the
missing months with a 0 value would be inaccurate. I acknowledge this as a limitation. No
autocorrelation was found when individual ACF and PACF plots were made. All ARIMA
(0,0,0) model residuals were no different than white noise (see Table 2). The regression
without AR or MA parameters (Table 3) for prison admissions predicted the intercept is
1.500, the pre-slope is 0.004, a non-significant change in level of 0.555 (p = 0.411) and a
non-significant change from pre (0.004) and post (-0.004) slopes of -0.008 (p = 0.798). The
regression shows that prison admissions in the low usage county stayed relatively the same
before and after the effective date of the new law. The predicted absolute change between
the counterfactual and fitted values in July 2016 was an insignificant increase of 0.265
(14.2%) in admissions to prison in the low usage county. During the post-intervention
period, the estimated total change is an increase of 15 people admitted to prison, which
does not support H1.
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Table 4. Hypothesis 2, Regression Coefficients and Absolute & Relative Change
Dependent Time Series (ARMA Model)
State of Oregon
Probation Admissions (2,2)
Value
(Std. Error)
t-value
909.87
(14.51)
62.67 ***
-0.31
(0.72)
-0.42
50.71
(23.50)
2.15 **
-0.71
(0.92)
-0.78

Dependent Time Series (ARMA Model)
High Usage County
Probation Admissions (0,1)
Value
(Std. Error)
t-value
150.48
(5.32)
28.27 ***
0.46
(0.24)
1.89
1.77
(7.35)
0.24
-1.49
(0.34)
-4.31 ***

Regression
Coefficients

Intercept
Time
Ilevel
Trend

Change

Absolute
Relative
Total

24.8
2.8%
1324

-52.0
-28.2%
-898

Regression
Coefficients

Intercept
Time
Ilevel
Trend

Medium Usage County
Probation Admissions (0,0)
Value
(Std. Error) t-value
47.70
(2.81)
16.94 ***
-0.31
(0.12)
-2.44 *
11.53
(3.90)
2.95 **
0.21
(0.18)
1.14

Low Usage County
Probation Admissions (0,0)
Value
(Std. Error)
t-value
7.98
(1.13)
7.04 *
-0.05
(0.05)
-1.10
2.11
(1.57)
1.34
0.04
(0.07)
0.51

Change

Absolute
Relative
Total

19.0
78.2%
531

3.48
93.2%
97

Signif. codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1

H2 – After the introduction of HB 3194, the probation admissions will increase.
The State of Oregon’s probation admissions ACF and PACF plots indicate the data
had serial autoregressive and moving average correlation. The data are best represented by
an ARIMA (2,0,2) model. All autoregressive and moving average parameters were
statistically significant. Additionally, the model residuals were no different than white
noise when passed through the Box-Ljung test (X2 = 31.526, df = 25, p = 0.172) therefore
I conclude that the ARIMA (2,0,2) model is the best fit. The regression accounting for the
ARMA (2,2) process coefficients (Table 4) produced an intercept of 909.87, a preintervention slope of -0.3070, a significant immediate change in level at the intervention
point by 50.715 (p = 0.034), and a non-significant change between the pre-slope and postslope of -0.719 (p = 0.439). The post intervention slope is -1.027. This suggests that before
the intervention, the use of probation admissions was in a slight decline. After the
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Figure 3. Oregon Probation Admissions by Month, June 2010 to July 2016

intervention, probations admissions increased after the enactment of justice reinvestment,
but continued to decline. However, by the end of the study period, more individuals were
admitted to probation than if HB 3194 (2013) had not been passed (Figure 3) which does
support H2. Calculating the absolute change as of July 2016, there was an increase of 24.8
individuals (2.8%) from the projected counterfactual. The estimated total change suggests
that the State of Oregon had an increase of 1,324 individuals admitted to probation between
July 2013 and July 2016.
The high usage county’s probation admissions (Figure 4) data showed moving
average correlation when ACF and PACF plots were made. The time series is best filtered
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Figure 4. The High Usage County Probation Admissions by Month, June 2010 to July 2016

by an ARIMA (0,1,1) model due to the amount of drift in the series. The MA parameter
was significant (Table 4) and the residuals were not different from white noise (X2 =
15.166, df = 25, p = 0.937), which provides the best fit model for filtering. The GLS
regression with ARMA (0,1) produced an intercept of 150.489, a pre-intervention slope of
0.461, a non-significant immediate change in level at the time of intervention of 1.768 (p
= 0.810), and a significant change between the pre-slope (0.46) and post intervention slope
(1.03) fits of -1.493 (p = 0.0001). These results are shown in Table 4. The count of prison
admissions is increasing before the intervention but is declining after the passage of justice
reinvestment with no immediate change at the time of the intervention. The change in slope
is in the opposite direction than was expected and does not support H2. Calculating the
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Figure 5. Medium Usage County Probation Admissions by Month, June 2010 to July 2016

absolute change from the end of the counterfactual and the real fitted data produced a
decrease of 52 individuals being admitted to probation which is a reduction of 28.2% by
July 2016. After the enrollment of HB 3194, the estimated total change in probation
admissions is a decrease of 898 admissions in the high usage county.
Probation admissions in the medium usage county (Figure 5) also did not show
autocorrelation of the raw data. The Box-Ljung test supports this assessment as the
residuals of the ARIMA (0,0,0) model are the same as white noise (X2 = 28.006, df = 25,
p = 0.307). The model is accepted and the GLS regression model without correlation
parameters was performed (coefficients in Table 4). This revealed an intercept of 47.702,
the pre-slope value as -0.315, a significant immediate change in level in July 2013 as
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11.532 (p = 0.004), and a non-significant change between pre (-0.315) and post (-0.106)
slopes of 0.208 (p = 0.258). Before the passage of justice reinvestment in Oregon, the
number of individuals being admitted to probation each month in the medium usage county
appears to have been in a state of moderate decline. However, after the bill was enacted,
there is a significant increase in the use of prison admissions and the slope changed to
decay less rapidly, supporting H2. This shows that the absolute change between the
counterfactual and the fitted values in July 2016 is an increase of 19 (78.2%) people being
admitted to probation. Contrary to the the high usage county results, the medium usage
proxy estimated total change is an increase of 531 individuals admitted to probation after
the passage of HB 3194.
There were sections of the data missing in the probation admissions data sets for
the low usage county likely due to the sparse offending population in this rural county. As
with the prison admissions data set, no autocorrelation was found when individual ACF
and PACF plots were made. All ARIMA (0,0,0) model residuals were no different than
white noise (see Table 2). The regression model (without ARMA) of probation admissions
predicted that the intercept is 7.981, the pre slope is -0.057, a non-significant change of
level of 2.115 (p = 0.182) in July 2013, and a non-significant change in slope from pre (0.057) to post (0.019) of 0.037 (p = 0.607). As neither the slope or level changes were
significant, it is concluded that probation admissions exhibited no changes after the passage
of justice reinvestment. However, the estimated total change of the post justice
reinvestment period was an increase of 97 individuals admitted to probation despite nonsignificant changes in the data level or trends.

44
Table 5. Hypothesis 3, Regression Coefficients and Absolute & Relative Change
Dependent Time Series (ARMA Model)
State of Oregon
Community Supervision (2,3)
Value
(Std. Error)
t-value
1173.46
(25.16)
46.63 ***
-0.26
(1.15)
-0.22
41.41
(32.15)
1.29
-0.95
(2.01)
-0.47

Regression
Coefficients

Intercept
Time
Ilevel
Trend

Change

Absolute
Relative
Total

13.9
1.21%
-774

Regression
Coefficients

Intercept
Time
Ilevel
Trend

Medium Usage County
Community Supervision (1,1)
Value
(Std. Error) t-value
51.48
(3.51)
14.65 ***
-0.29
(0.16)
-1.81
10.40
(4.88)
2.12 *
0.19
(0.27)
0.71

Change

Absolute
Relative
Total

16.1
50.5%
370

Dependent Time Series (ARMA Model)
High Usage County
Community Supervision (0,0)
Value
(Std. Error)
t-value
242.95
(7.53)
32.22 ***
-0.35
(0.35)
-1.01
21.84
(10.91)
2.00 *
-1.44
(0.58)
-2.45 **
-19.9
-9.1%
-14
Low Usage County
Community Supervision (0,0)
Value
(Std. Error)
t-value
7.41
(0.92)
8.07 ***
-0.03
(0.04)
-0.73
2.01
(1.33)
1.50
-0.004
(0.07)
-0.06
1.88
35.3%
54

Signif. codes: 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1

H3 – After the introduction of HB 3194, the community supervision populations will
increase.
The State’s community supervision populations were best modeled by an ARIMA
(2,0,3) after ACF and PACF plots were made, showing both autoregressive and moving
average errors. The model is concluded as the best fit as all parameters were significant as
show in Table 2, and the model residuals were white noise (X2 = 35.861, df = 25, p =
0.073). The GLS – ML regression with ARMA (2,3) coefficients (Table 5), produced an
intercept of 1173.458, a pre-intervention slope of -0.258 which is near flat, a nonsignificant intervention level change of 41.415 (p = 0.202), and a non-significant change
in slope of -0.9473 (p = 0.639). The post slope was calculated to be -1.21. The count of
individuals on probation or parole by month shows similar trends as probation admissions.
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Figure 6. The High Usage County Community Supervision Population, July 2010 to December 2015

Both the pre-slope and the post-slope are in decline, with a small increase after the
enrollment of the law. However, neither of these changes in the post-intervention period
are significant. The calculation of the estimated total change after the enrollment of HB
3194 is an increase of 774 people under community supervision in Oregon. The absolute
change as of December 2015 was 13.9 (1.21%) from the end of the counterfactual
projection of the pre time series.
Individuals admitted to community supervision in the high usage county (Figure 6)
did not show serial autocorrelation when the ACF and PACF plots were made. The BoxLjung test on the ARIMA (0,0,0) model reveals that the residuals were not different from
white noise (X2 = 20.495, df = 25, p = 0.720). Therefore, the model is accepted as a good

46
fit. The GLS regression without ARMA parameters (coefficients shown in Table 5)
modeled the intercept to be 242.950, the pre-intervention slope as -0.359, a significant
immediate change of level at the time of the intervention of 21.842 (p = 0.049), and a
significant change between the pre-intervention slope (-0.359) and the post-intervention
slope (-1.800) of -1.441 (p = 0.016). In figure 5, the analysis reveals a slight decline in the
combined probation and parole population with a significant level change at the time of the
intervention. The post slope rapidly decreases, where the absolute change between the
actual and counterfactual values in December 2016 was a decrease of 19.9 (-9.1%)
individuals on community supervision. Overall, the estimated total change during the postintervention period is a decrease of 14 individuals on community supervision. This
provides mixed support for H3 because the initial increase is significant but the population
trend moves in the opposite direction at a greater rate.
The total number of individuals on community supervision in the medium usage
county (figure 7) contained autocorrelation in the ACF and PACF plots. An ARIMA (1,0,1)
model best filters the data: the AR and MA parameters were both significant (Table 2) and
the residuals were no different than white noise (X2 = 25.732, df = 25, p = 0.422) and the
model is accepted. As shown in Table 5, the GLS regression with ARMA (1,1) predicted
the intercept at 51.488, a pre-intervention slope of -0.297, a significant immediate change
at the intervention of 10.406 (p = 0.037), and a non- significant change between the preslope (-0.297) and post-slope (-0.102) of 0.195 (p = 0.479). The community supervision
population (probation and parole) exhibit similar trends and trend changes as the probation
admission data. There is an increase of individuals on community supervision directly after
the intervention, and the rate of decay decreases, suggesting that more individuals are under
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community supervision (H3). The absolute change in December 2015 between the
counterfactual and fitted values was an increase of 16.1 (50.5%) people on community
supervision. Furthermore, the estimated total change is an increase of 370 individuals on
community supervision in the medium usage county.
Finally, no data were missing from the community supervision data set. ACF and
PACF plots showed no autocorrelation in the data, and the residuals were no different than
white noise (Table 2). The low usage county’s correctional supervision GLS regression
(without ARMA) revealed an intercept of 7.419, a pre slope of -0.031, a non-significant
change in level of 2.008 (p = 0.136), and a non-significant change in slope from pre and
post (-0.035) values of -0.004 (p = 0.951). In conjunction with the other two low usage
county analyses, there appears to be no change on community supervision populations after
HB 3194 (2013) was passed. Overall, I estimate the total change between July 2013 and
December 2015 to be an increase of 54 people on community supervision in the low usage
county.
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Discussion
Oregon’s House Bill 3194 (2013) restructured parts of the criminal code:
reclassifying driving infractions, reducing the penalty for marijuana offenses and increased
transitional leave. The goal of this was to reduce the number of people the state was sending
to prison by increasing the use of evidence-based programs on both the front-end and the
back-end of the court system. Increases in probation or parole would suggest the success
of implementation and county buy-in. The law also includes the Oregon Justice
Reinvestment grant to aid counties in funding programs that are outside their budget.
Decreases in custody populations (prison or jail) would also suggest the success of the bill:
if rehabilitation and diverted sentence programs are effective, less individuals will be
sentenced to serve time. Less individuals serving time translates to dollars saved, and more
funding for OJRG programs. In this study, levels of implementation have been assigned by
the number of OJRG programs in use with a high of 12 in the high usage county, a medium
of 7 in the medium usage proxy, and a low of 2 in the low usage county.
The Bureau of Justice Assistance assessed eight states where the Justice
Reinvestment Initiative had assisted in the construction of justice reinvestment law which
had been in effect for one year. The report revealed that all of the states: Arkansas, Hawaii,
Louisiana, Kentucky, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, and South Carolina, had seen
substantial decreases in their prison populations. The fiscal impact report from the
legislative fiscal office (2013) called for a reduction in prison bed counts by 700 over the
first biennium and by another 800 beds in the second biennium after the law’s passage
(LFO, 2013). The state of Oregon has achieved an estimated decrease of 670 offenders
being admitted to prison after the introduction of justice reinvestment. The goals of the first
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biennium have very nearly been met, yet it has taken an additional year to achieve. The
high usage proxy achieved the only significant change between the pre and post periods,
with a substantial drop immediately and a decreased trend of prison admissions. I estimate
that this resulted in the high usage county decreasing their prison admissions by 778
individuals. The two other county proxies, the medium usage and the low usage, did not
achieve substantial changes and had slight increases in prison admissions.
Therefore, I find support on the state level and conditional support by counties for
hypothesis 1. The county results make direct assertions more complicated. The high usage
proxy county has significant trend changes between the pre and post intervention periods
in the expected direction. The medium usage county prison admissions do not show any
significant changes in either immediate impact on the data at the date of the intervention
or trend change between the pre- and post-intervention periods. This could be the result of
the medium usage county focusing on back-end (parole) programing after HB 3194 was
enrolled. Furthermore, the low usage county prison admissions show no change in either
immediate impact or pre-post trend change. This failure to reach statistical significance
could reflect statistical power and low base rate limitations, but also could reflect that given
that each county has similar rates across all measures a critical threshold of programming
may be required to be met before justice reinvestment can be effective. It appears that the
high usage county, which has one of the highest populations in Oregon and implementation
level, affects state trends for prison admissions but may be dampened by lower usage
counties. Ultimately, prison admissions have declined in Oregon after the passage of HB
3194.
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I also analyze probation admissions in the evaluation of other measures that could
provide evidence for the effectiveness of justice reinvestment. Previous research has not
examined probation admissions directly or the number of individuals on community
supervision. Hypothesis 2, that probation admissions will increase, is supported by the
overall state increase in probation admissions. Probation admissions at the state level show
that there was an immediate impact from the passage of justice reinvestment which resulted
in the estimated total increase of 1,300 individuals admitted to probation in the State. The
results provide evidence that justice reinvestment is deferring more individuals to probation
across the state.
Again, analyses of county probations provide conflicting results. The high usage
county data reflect opposite results to the State. The data reveal no significant immediate
impact however the change of slope between pre and post is significant. This amounts to
an estimated 900 person decrease by the end of the study period. The high usage proxy
appears to be admitting less people to probation which does not support hypothesis 2. This
could be due to a focus by the high usage county justice reinvestment programming on
intensive supervision or a higher frequency of jail usage. Further study is required to
understand the decreases in the high usage county’s probation admissions. Additionally,
the decline in probation admissions could be affecting the overall community supervision
population: if parole admissions increased after justice reinvestment but then remained
stable (only level change), these effects might be washed out by stark declines in probation
admissions. As the community supervision measure is a combination of probation and
parole, future research should investigate parole admissions as well.
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The medium usage county’s probation admission data indicate a significant
immediate impact with an increase of about 12 people without a significant trend change
between the pre- and post-periods. However, before the passage of justice reinvestment
probation admissions were in decline. After the passage of HB 3194 (2013), the rate of
decline slowed. By the end of the study period, this amounts to an estimated 531 person
increase of admissions to probation than if justice reinvestment had not been enrolled. The
low usage county’s probation admission data did not show any significant change in
immediate level or trend, but does mirror the State and the medium usage results. The
medium usage and similar counties appear to have a sustained increase in level of probation
admissions and an increase in the rate of use of probation. These increases appear to be
influencing the state data. Additionally, because the high usage county has about 20% of
the state population and about 20% of the admissions, the high usage’s substantial drop in
trend could be moderating the state trend.
I also find moderate support for hypothesis 3. The total number of individuals on
community supervision at the state level has no significant change in either immediate
impact or trend change. Despite not achieving significance, I estimate there has about 770
more individuals under probation and parole across the State. However, there is significant
immediate impact and trend change for the high usage county which results in an estimated
total decrease of 14 people under community supervision. Alternatively, the medium usage
data show that before the passage of justice reinvestment community supervision was
declining and increased dramatically after the bill was passed. The low usage county
community corrections data does not reveal any significant changes in impact or trend.
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There is a minor increase in level at the intervention date but the trend of the post period is
nearly identical that of the pre-period.
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Limitations
As with all research, this study’s findings should not be taken without considering
the context of its limitations. The first limitation is the assumption that was made to
maintain the integrity of the time series frequency for the low usage county’s prison
admissions data in allocating zeros to all missing data. In addition, the low base rate and
statistical power of the low usage county make the interpretation of these results nearly
difficult. If this assumption is incorrect, and there was simply no reporting for the missing
months, then this could be masking real values greater than zero. Furthermore, as Hinkle
and colleagues describe, with small counties (or political units), measurement is difficult
because of low base rates and low statistical power (Hinkle et. al, 2013). Second, collecting
community supervision and recidivism data beginning at the 2010 cohort meant that there
was a major phase-in period of a year and a half before the data stabilized. When the
number of recidivists per month was calculated it revealed a curvilinear increase from July
2010 to June of 2012 beginning at zero. Any regression performed on this data would be
significantly influenced by this phase-in period; it would produce erroneous calculations
of the pre time series intercept and slope (example included in Appendix E). This masks
any real trend the pre-intervention period might have had and therefore makes analysis
impossible.
Not having access to financial data for the counties’ expenditures on evidencebased programing prevents this from being an encompassing evaluation of the outcome
measures of HB 3194 (2013). The law calls for 75% of all county expenditure on
programming to be evidence-based. The requirement for empirical support of any
particular treatment or program mandates that each county will implement what works.
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The OJR grant can be a majority of that percentage, or it could be far less. An example of
this would be if a county has already been funding programs that are evidence-based and
uses the OJR grant for two new programs in the 2015-2017 biennium. Access to financial
data would be a more accurate way to measure implementation of justice reinvestment.
There also exists a “black-box” problem with this study of justice reinvestment.
Without process/ implementation evaluations, this study cannot say how or why HB 3194
is producing the effects that are seen in the analyses. For example, Multnomah County
receives $1.3 million from the OJR grant for each of three subtypes: alcohol and drug
treatment, supervision, and mentoring services. For the $1.3 million received for alcohol
and drug treatment, this could fund one large program or several smaller programs. The
variance in programming could produce inconsistent effects on the measured populations.
Furthermore, programs that are being implemented may not be following fidelity to the
theory of the program. The results of justice reinvestment depend heavily on program
fidelity across the state and counties. If a county uses an evidence-based model for a new
program but does not implement correctly, the program may produce iatrogenic effects.
Additionally, not all counties roll out their programs at the same time. This could result in
a lag in the implementation of justice reinvestment, which would be interpreted as findings
of no significance effect within the study period.
Finally, confining the dependent variables to those explicitly stated in HB 3194
(2013) may limit further understanding of the impact of the intervention. System
thermodynamics (Wright and Rosky, 2011) suggests that added pressure of change in the
system will affect other microsystems not directly targeted or addressed by the bill. For
example, if more individuals are being released into community corrections and
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rehabilitation programs on parole or probation, logically it would follow that case numbers
would rise for probation or parole officers (unless more officers are hired), adding
additional stresses which could translate to increased violations in order to decrease case
numbers. Population changes could also affect the measures by increasing the number of
individuals convicted of crime. This could result in higher numbers of individuals being
admitted to prison or probation and increase community supervision populations.

56
Conclusion
Sentencing law changes beginning in the 1970s have compounded to produce an
approximately 350% increase in the incarcerated populations of the United States. Total
expenditures for federal corrections had risen above $51 billion by 2012 (BJA, 2014). In
Oregon, the incarcerated population has increased nearly 50%, from 9,491 in 2000 to
13,784 in 2010 (BJA, 2014). The revolving door effect will continue to create an issue for
federal, state, and local justice systems. This study suggests that justice reinvestment in
Oregon appears to achieve its goals in many ways, but the magnitude depends on each
county and its implementation adherence. Overall, prison admissions and probation
admissions in the state have changed in the intended direction of justice reinvestment.
However, the county level results show a variety of outcomes that are produced by the law.
The policy implications of this are that justice reinvestment is producing reductions in
admissions, but continuance of this depends on the level of utilization of the grant. For
each county, policies should be adopted that focus on their individual needs that reinforce
and support evidence-based programing. Furthermore, while initial success of HB 3194
has been seen in the three years after its enrollment, counties are still implementing justice
reinvestment. An example of this is the low usage proxy, which increased the number of
programs for which it received funding for by 5 in two years. Further implementation
throughout Oregon will most likely continue to produce an actualization of the goals set
out by the legislature. This will have increased returns for the state aggregate totals, and
therefore continue to produce savings throughout Department of Corrections budgets.
However, according to Tucker and Cadora (2013), rehabilitation and reentry services are
only one of four areas of reinvestment that can reduce recidivism. While the returns on this
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investment might be lagged by many years, further funding should be considered for
allocation to mental health, education, and community development as crime prevention
tactics.
By providing assistance to counties to utilize evidence-based practices for the
program subtypes I argue that these findings have a combined effect on the total
supervision population of Oregon. Justice reinvestment has reduced incarcerated
populations and increased incarceration deferment and community supervision
populations. The direction of future research should focus on determining the effect of
justice reinvestment on the total number of individuals under state supervision, if there is
an effect on public safety, measuring the effect of the bill on recidivism, and determining
the change of county expenditures on evidence-based programming.
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Appendix A – County Subtype and Populations
Table A1. Oregon Justice Reinvestment Grant Funded Subtypes by County with
Population Estimates by County
County
Subtypes Population Estimate - 2013
Baker County, Oregon
4
16,094
Benton County, Oregon
5
86,066
Clackamas County, Oregon
8
387,995
Clatsop County, Oregon
8
37,093
Columbia County, Oregon
6
49,224
Coos County, Oregon
6
62,563
Crook County, Oregon
5
20,776
Curry County, Oregon
2
22,240
Deschutes County, Oregon
7
165,859
Douglas County, Oregon
6
106,803
Gilliam County, Oregon
5
1,945
Grant County, Oregon
5
7,272
Harney County, Oregon
3
7,175
Hood River County, Oregon
5
22,614
Jackson County, Oregon
8
207,862
Jefferson County, Oregon
5
21,842
Josephine County, Oregon
5
83,268
Klamath County, Oregon
4
65,830
Lake County, Oregon
4
7,806
Lane County, Oregon
11
355,812
Lincoln County, Oregon
5
46,257
Linn County, Oregon
9
118,496
Malheur County, Oregon
6
30,633
Marion County, Oregon
12
321,572
Morrow County, Oregon
2
11,237
Multnomah County, Oregon
12
765,850
Polk County, Oregon
6
76,753
Sherman County, Oregon
7
1,711
Tillamook County, Oregon
7
25,337
Umatilla County, Oregon
4
76,802
Union County, Oregon
5
25,519
Wallowa County, Oregon
7
6,789
Wasco County, Oregon
4
25,458
Washington County, Oregon
10
555,089
Wheeler County, Oregon
2
1,387
Yamhill County, Oregon
5
100,722
Population Source: U.S. Census, 2018
Subtype Source: CJC Interactive Data, 2018
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Appendix B – Normality test

Table B.1 Tests of Normality
Kolmogorov-Smirnova
Statistic
df
Sig.
State Prison Admissions
0.069
74
0.200*
State Probation Admissions
0.061
74
0.200*
State Community Supervision
0.071
66
0.200*
HU Prison Admissions
0.102
74
0.056
HU Probation Admissions
0.066
74
0.200*
HU Community Supervision
0.084
66
0.200*
MU Prison Admissions
0.141
74
0.001
MU Probation Admissions
0.085
74
0.200*
MU Community Supervision
0.071
66
0.200*
LU Prison Admissions
0.186
74
0.000
LU Probation Admissions
0.135
74
0.002
LU Community Supervision
0.132
66
0.006
* This is a lower bound of the true significance.

Statistic
0.985
0.984
0.984
0.966
0.971
0.967
0.973
0.988
0.984
0.884
0.954
0.956

Shapiro-Wilk
df
74
74
66
74
74
66
74
74
66
74
74
66

Sig.
0.529
0.473
0.566
0.044
0.092
0.078
0.108
0.696
0.536
0.000
0.009
0.020
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Appendix C – Descriptive Statistics by Year Within Study
Prison Admissions
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

Table C1. High Usage County Descriptive Statistics by Year
N Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Mean % Change Mean Rate Per 100,000
7
65
86
8.214
75.86
10.29
12
58
98
11.733
78.25
3.15%
10.46
12
67
102
9.913
84.08
7.45%
11.08
12
68
104
12.078
85.67
1.89%
11.19
12
54
104
14.841
72.42 -15.47%
9.32
12
60
85
7.012
69.58 -3.92%
8.82
7
63
80
5.598
71.00
2.04%
8.88

Probation Admissions
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

N Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation
7
144
163
7.047
12 129
202
19.678
12 138
185
12.803
12 139
213
18.466
12 137
187
16.971
12 124
157
10.805
7
131
155
7.946

Mean % Change Mean Rate Per 100,000
153.00
20.75
158.83 3.81%
21.23
158.50 -0.21%
20.88
165.42 4.37%
21.6
164.25 -0.71%
21.13
138.25 -15.83%
17.52
141.86 2.61%
17.74

Community Supervision N Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Mean % Change Mean Rate Per 100,000
2010
6
218
260
16.999
235.83
31.98
2011
12 205
293
24.742
243.17 3.11%
32.5
2012
12 193
266
22.437
232.17 -4.52%
30.59
2013
12 201
297
26.778
233.83 0.71%
30.53
2014
12 191
286
26.431
237.33 1.50%
30.54
2015
12 191
227
13.511
208.00 -12.36%
26.36
Note: Population data was collected from the U.S. Census (U.S. Census, 2018)

Prison Admissions
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

Table C2. Medium Usage County Descriptive Statistics by Year
N Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Mean % Change Mean Rate Per 100,000
7
7
24
5.398
16.14
10.23
12
8
20
3.988
14.08
-12.76%
8.81
12
10
21
3.175
15.42
9.52%
9.53
12
8
21
4.224
14.75
-4.35%
8.89
12
12
30
4.569
17.83
20.88%
10.48
12
10
23
3.911
17.25
-3.25%
9.86
7
14
21
2.309
18.00
4.35%
9.93

Probation Admissions
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

N Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation
7
44
58
5.21
12
25
56
9.808
12
29
48
5.944
12
31
61
7.728
12
33
59
7.596
12
20
57
10.633
7
33
58
8.58

Mean
49.86
40.25
39.33
41.50
48.67
45.17
41.57

% Change Mean Rate Per 100,000
31.59
-19.27%
25.19
-2.29%
24.31
5.52%
25.02
17.28%
28.6
-7.19%
25.82
-7.97%
22.93

Community Supervision N Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Mean % Change Mean Rate Per 100,000
2010
6
41
62
7.714
53.50
33.9
2011
12
35
58
7.794
45.25
-15.42%
28.32
2012
12
28
52
7.222
41.83
-7.56%
25.86
2013
12
35
59
7.953
46.17
10.38%
27.84
2014
12
37
72
8.569
53.83
16.59%
31.63
2015
12
29
62
9.882
47.25
-12.22%
27.01
Note: Population data was collected from the U.S. Census (U.S. Census, 2018)
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Prison Admissions
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

Table C3. Low Usage County Descriptive Statistics by Year
N Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Mean % Change Mean Rate Per 100,000
7
0
8
3.094
2.29
10.24
12
0
3
0.9
0.92
-59.83%
4.10
12
1
4
0.953
2.00
117.39%
8.99
12
0
4
1.379
2.08
4.00%
9.35
12
0
3
0.985
1.67
-19.71%
7.51
12
0
4
1.165
2.42
44.91%
10.81
7
0
4
1.464
2.14
-11.57%
9.42

Probation Admissions
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

N Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation
7
4
11
2.984
12
1
16
4.42
12
2
13
3.055
12
3
13
3.157
12
4
16
3.551
12
2
10
1.975
7
3
13
3.485

Mean
7.29
7.42
5.67
6.83
9.33
6.92
7.14

% Change
1.78%
-23.58%
20.46%
36.60%
-25.83%
3.18%

Community Supervision N Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation Mean % Change
2010
6
3
13
3.445
7.67
2011
12
3
12
2.541
6.50
-15.25%
2012
12
3
15
3.257
6.67
2.62%
2013
12
3
11
2.575
7.42
11.24%
2014
12
5
13
2.588
8.17
10.11%
2015
12
3
11
2.261
7.25
-11.26%
Note: Population data was collected from the U.S. Census (U.S. Census, 2018)

Mean Rate Per 100,000
32.59
33.05
25.50
30.71
41.96
30.90
31.44
Mean Rate Per 100,000
34.29
28.95
30.00
33.36
36.74
32.37
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Appendix D – Figures of raw data, ACF plots, PACF, and GLS plots
State Figures - Prison Admissions

State of Oregon raw data with OLS

ACF plot for raw data

Partial ACF for raw data

Final model fitted by GLS
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Probation Admissions

State of Oregon raw data with OLS

ACF plot for raw data

Partial ACF for raw data

Final model fitted by GLS
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State Community Supervision

State of Oregon raw data with OLS

Partial ACF for raw data

ACF plot for raw data

Final model fitted by GLS
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High Usage County
Prison Admissions

High Usage raw data with OLS

ACF plot for raw data

Partial ACF for raw data

Final model fitted by GLS
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Probation Admissions

High Usage raw data with OLS

ACF plot for raw data

Partial ACF for raw data

Final model fitted by GLS
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Community Supervision

High Usage raw data with OLS

Partial ACF for raw data

ACF plot for raw data

Final model fitted by GLS
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The Medium Usage County
Prison Admissions

Medium usage proxy raw data with OLS

ACF plot for raw data

Partial ACF for raw data

Final model fitted by GLS
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Probation Admissions

Medium usage proxy raw data with OLS

ACF plot for raw data

Partial ACF for raw data

Final model fitted by GLS
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Community Supervision

Medium usage proxy raw data with OLS

Partial ACF for raw data

ACF plot for raw data

Final model fitted by GLS
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Low Usage County
Prison Admissions

Low usage proxy raw data with OLS

ACF plot for raw data

Partial ACF for raw data

Final model fitted by GLS
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Probation Admissions

Low usage proxy raw data with OLS

ACF plot for raw data

Partial ACF for raw data

Final model fitted by GLS

78
Community Supervision

Low usage proxy raw data with OLS

ACF plot for raw data

Partial ACF for raw data

Final model fitted by GLS
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Appendix E – Recidivism Example

Example of recidivism rate data with phase in period.

